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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role of law enforcement personnel at weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and hazardous materials incidents with regard to WMD training, 
standards, and preparedness, and identifies gaps and problems in current local law 
enforcement WMD response preparedness. Different models of local law  
enforcement WMD response are analyzed to compare with the New York City  
model, and the U.S. Bomb Squad and United Kingdom law enforcement 
chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear training programs are examined as examples of 
successful national preparedness response programs. The implications of this thesis 
indicate a need for a national strategy for local law enforcement WMD training, 
equipment and operating procedures to better coordinate response efforts between local 
law enforcement agencies at WMD incidents. 
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New York City (NYC) has been the target of domestic and foreign terrorism since its 
beginning four centuries ago, and the last decade has proven no exception. Local police 
agencies have dedicated significant resources to train and equip their personnel to 
successfully prevent, defend against and defeat terrorism attempts against NYC and its 
populace. NYC and its immediate municipal neighbors differ significantly from some 
other cities since it mandated the local police department is in charge of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) incidents solely, through its Citywide Incident Management System.  
This thesis examines the role of law enforcement personnel at weapons of mass 
destruction and hazardous materials incidents with regard to WMD training, standards 
and preparedness for the purpose of identifying gaps and problems in current local law 
enforcement WMD response preparedness. WMD preparedness training for local law 
enforcement agencies currently follows the scope and role of local enforcement 
responsibilities at WMD incidents, which is defined by local municipalities’ individual 
emergency management policies and guidelines. The wide variety of training given to 
local law enforcement personnel related to local law enforcement WMD response 
contributes to the lack of coordination between local law enforcement agencies at WMD 
incidents.  The lack of national standards for law enforcement agencies regarding local 
law enforcement WMD response personnel for training, equipment and operating 
procedures adds greatly to the lack of coordination between local law enforcement 
agencies at WMD incidents. The lack of a national standard for local law enforcement 
preparedness for WMD incidents reflected in the current disparity of knowledge, skills 
and abilities of local law enforcement agency personnel regarding WMD preparedness is 
indicative of the pressing need for the development of a mandatory national law 
enforcement WMD response preparedness standard that matches law enforcement 
agencies’ expected competencies at a WMD incident.  
Different models of local law enforcement WMD response are analyzed to 
compare with the New York City model, utilizing four different cities’ law enforcement 
WMD response capabilities as examples. The four different models examined include 
 xii 
law enforcement utilizing only non-law enforcement personnel for primary WMD 
response capabilities; law enforcement working jointly with non-law enforcement 
personnel for joint primary WMD response capabilities; law enforcement working solely 
with law enforcement personnel for primary WMD response capabilities; and law 
enforcement working solely with law enforcement personnel for hazmat-specific 
capabilities. The U.S. Bomb Squad and United Kingdom law enforcement CBRN 
training programs are examined as examples of successful national preparedness response 
programs. The U.S. Bomb Squad’s credentialing process is studied as a model for a law 
enforcement national credentialing program for WMD response, and the United Kingdom 
law enforcement CBRN training programs are reviewed as a model for national law 
enforcement WMD response training. The implications of this thesis indicate a need for a 
national strategy for local law enforcement WMD training, equipment and operating 
procedures to better coordinate response efforts between local law enforcement agencies 
at WMD incidents. 
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The growing threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), as well as hazardous materials (HazMat) both as weapons and in 
criminal activities, has significantly altered the traditional philosophies of 
HazMat emergency response for the law enforcement community.1 
Since the 1995,AumShinrikyosarin nerve agent attacks in Tokyo’s subway 
system, law enforcement agencies worldwide have realized the need to have sufficient 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response capabilities to adequately address terrorist 
incidents involving the intentional use of these substances to cause loss of life and 
property.2 The anthrax attacks of 2001 only heightened that concern.3 At the local, state 
and federal levels, law enforcement agencies have similar WMD threats and yet have 
dissimilar, uncoordinated capabilities, equipment and training.4 There are responsibilities 
specific to law enforcement at terrorist incidents involving 
chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) materials, and these responsibilities 
have expanded since 9/11—overall site management, evidence preservation and 
sampling, and criminal investigation. The problem has two components: 
1. No governmental standard or credentialing currently exists for local law 
enforcement WMD hazardous materials response teams; 
2. Local law enforcement WMD HazMat response capabilities nationally are 
uneven and fundamentally distinct. 
The ramifications for these deficiencies are significant. The lack of a national 
standard for local law enforcement WMD response teams equates to depending solely on 
the local, parochial response mechanisms that currently exist regardless of the magnitude 
and complexity of the WMD threat. Voluntary consensus standards have traditionally 
                                                 
1 Patrick, Steven, “Law Enforcement and Hazmat/ WMD Emergency Response,” The FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin 7, no. 3 (March 2008): 16. 
2 Carrus, W. Seth. Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents since 1900 
(Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2001). 
3 Homeland Defense Business Unit, Biological Incident Operations: A Guide for Law Enforcement 
(Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, 2004). 
4 Canada, Benjamin, Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Responders (CRS Report 
RL31680) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003). 
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focused on law enforcement agencies having an “awareness” or defensive role, which is 
simply getting officers or civilians out of a hot (hazardous) zone, and not conducting 
operations within.5 
B. TOWARD A COMMON STANDARD 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security proposed that the Department 
of Homeland Security develop “national standards for emergency response training and 
preparedness,” including a first responder certification program, a national training 
program, and equipment standards.6 Unfortunately mandatory standards were not 
enforced, relying instead on a defacto process that allowed municipalities based on 
jurisdiction to develop their own standard operational procedures, training components, 
and equipment requirements.7 The United States still utilizes a hodgepodge national 
approach to local law enforcement HazMat response capabilities. In 2003, Ben Canada 
noted in “Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Preparedness” that:  
A comprehensive federal policy on preparedness standards for local law 
enforcement could address at least two issues. First, it could address the 
development and maintenance of preparedness standards that meet 
national preparedness goals. Second, it could promote state and local 
adoption of standards…these national preparedness standards can be 
described in terms of scope, development process, and user community. 
They can include training competencies, equipment requirements, and 
operational procedures.8 
The past 10 years have seen a growth of non-standardized policies, training and 
equipment for local law enforcement agencies regarding WMD incident response. 
Although the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was designed to further 
coordinate domestic incident response preparedness through “a core set of concepts, 
principles, procedures, organizational processes, terminology, and standard requirements 
applicable to a broad community of NIMS users,” the fact remains that when it comes to 
                                                 
5 Canada, Homeland Security, 7. 
6 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002), 44. 
7 Canada, Homeland Security, 5. 
8 Ibid., 8. 
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the topic of WMD incident response, local law enforcement agencies nationwide lack 
that very coordination.9 The following example highlights the dual problems of local law 
enforcement agencies’ lack of protocols/equipment/training standardization and uneven 
response capabilities regarding WMD incident response. 
C. AN EXAMPLE OF MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION PROBLEMS:  
NYC FIRST RESPONDER AGENCIES ANDNON-NYC FIRST 
RESPONDER AGENCIES, OR CIMS VERSUS NIMS 
Even in larger metropolitan areas, the lack of standardized protocols, equipment 
and training makes it difficult to share resources across jurisdictional borders. For 
instance, in New York City, the crux of multi-agency coordination problems lies in the 
differences in New York City’s Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) versus 
NIMS, of which the following are examples: CIMS assigns incident command and 
responsibility for specific types of incidents to the agencies whose core competencies are 
appropriate for the incidents. NYC enjoys an emergency management system that has 
some first responder agencies with similar capabilities, requiring the designation of 
(agency) incident commander through the CIMS’ agency matrix.10 This agency matrix is 
important in determining which first responder agency is in charge of incidents where 
multiple agencies have an overlap of skill sets, called “Core Competencies” in CIMS.11 
CIMS further lists the “primary agency” as the agency “designated to have overall 
responsibility of an incident, including overall management of strategic and tactical 
operations… and will coordinate with supporting agencies to successfully achieve 
incident objectives.12 The primary agency designated at chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear/hazardous material incidents is the NYPD, until “the NYPD 
determines that there is no actual or suspected criminal activity or terrorism.”13 The 
                                                 
9 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 2008, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, retrieved May 18, 2010, from 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.  
10 City of New York, “CIMS: Primary Agency Matrix,” 2013, City of New York, retrieved June 10, 





“CBRN/HazMat” core competencies of the NYPD include: overall site management, 
assessment, and investigations for criminal activity or terrorism.14 The developers of 
CIMS likely realized the importance of local law enforcement control of criminal or 
terrorist incidents involving WMD, and the already existing robust HazMat capabilities 
and experience residing within the NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit regarding WMD 
response and mitigation undoubtedly played a role in that decision-making process. As 
early as 1962, during the threat of impending nuclear war, the Emergency Service Unit 
was recognized as the primary agency in charge of NYC WMD response: 
In a master mobilization plan drawn up in 1962 for major disasters, the 
ESD [Emergency Service Division] occupies the number one position as 
the “forward operation” to spearhead search and rescue efforts…the unit’s 
extensive array of RADIAC (Radioactivity Detection Identification and 
Computation) equipment is also geared to cope with potential accidents at 
any of hundreds of university research installations, hospital laboratories 
and industrial plants throughout the city that employ radioactive materials 
in their work.15 
The NYPD’s many other specialized units have different responsibilities 
throughout the life cycle of a major incident, from initial response to demobilization of 
resources.16 The following CIMS graphic displays the life cycle of a multi-agency 
incident in New York City.17 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Egan, Cy. Some Very Special Men: The Emergency Service to the Rescue. (1st ed.) (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1974), 226–227. 
16 Hanson, Joel. Radiological Dispersal Device Primer: From a Terrorist’s Perspective, master’s 
thesis, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 2008. 
17New York City Office of Emergency Management, New York City Citywide Incident Management 
System (New York: New York City Office of Emergency Management, 2005). 
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Figure 1.  NYC Multi-Agency Response Incident Life Cycle 
Since, however, the agency matrix is not a part of NIMS it has the potential to 
complicate incident command and control for emergency management agencies for 
municipalities unfamiliar with CIMS when involved in multi-jurisdictional incidents: 
1. CIMS has an operational construct known as “Unified Operations 
Section” as opposed to NIMS’ “Operations Section.”18 The differences 
are not in name alone, as a Unified Operations Section is composed of 
                                                 
18 City of New York, “CIMS: General ICS Organization Structure,” last modified 2010, City of New 
York, retrieved March 10, 2011, from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/about/cims_ics.shtml. 
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operations section chiefs from different disciplines (fire, EMS, police) as 
opposed to NIMS’ operations section deputy chiefs. The NIMS’ Operation 
Section utilizes representatives from each discipline and/or jurisdiction as 
either chief or deputy chief depending on the nature of the incident. These 
individuals are usually co-located and work together for a coordinated 
multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional response. 
2. CIMS utilizes safety officers from each representative agency with no lead 
Safety Officer in control. This contrasts with the NIMS definition of a sole 
Safety Officer at an incident with an unlimited number of assistant Safety 
Officers who do not have the authorities of the sole safety officer. This 
would include being unable to stop operations due to potential dangerous 
conditions.  
3. CIMS has a robust intelligence/investigation element which is heavily 
related to the duties of law enforcement investigative personnel. This 
element can function as a single unit up to and including a section. 
4. CIMS contains unique terminology at odds with NIMS. An example is the 
replacement of the NIMS’ term “division,” which defines a geographical 
area, with the term “sector.” This is due to historical use of the term 
“division” in New York City to mean an administrative portion of city 
government, while sector historically meant a geographical area.  
These issues will not necessarily be apparent when New York City resources are 
utilized simply for logistical support, but have the potential to become barriers when New 
York City first responder agencies have command and control roles at multi-
jurisdictional incidents. 
The result of over $31 billion spent by the Department of Homeland Security 
through preparedness grants for equipment and training since 2003; the introduction of a 
domestic national incident management system in 2004; and the many thousands of first 
responders who have participated in federal WMD training programs have not been 
enough to develop a standardized local law enforcement response to WMD incidents 
nationally.19 Former New York City Office of Emergency Management Commissioner 
Jerry Hauer commented, “There is not one city in the country that is even close to 
prepared for dealing with even a small nuclear event.20 The issue of standardizing local 
                                                 
19 Napolitano, Janet. “Remarks as Prepared by Secretary Napolitano to New York City First 
Responders,” September 10, 2010 [news release], U.S. Department of Homeland Security, retrieved 
January 13, 2011, from http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1284133372649.shtm. 
20 Emily Friedman, “With WMD Attack Likely, Can the U.S. Cope?” ABC News, December 3, 2008, 
retrieved February 2, 2010, from http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6378675. 
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law enforcement WMD incident preparedness and response on a national scale requires 
further exploration. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does current local law enforcement WMD response preparedness align with 
current WMD threats? This thesis examines the role of law enforcement personnel at 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and hazardous materials incidents with regard to WMD 
training, standards and preparedness, and identifies gaps and problems in current local 
law enforcement WMD response preparedness. Different models of local law 
enforcement WMD response are examined to compare with the New York City model, 
and the U.S. Bomb Squad and United Kingdom law enforcement CBRN training 
programs are examined as examples of successful national preparedness response 
programs. 
1. Significance of Research 
Local law enforcement agencies need to be able to efficiently share resources 
across jurisdictional lines, particularly in rural areas that do not normally have enough 
resources to handle large WMD incidents. The potential impact of developing a national 
policy addressing consistent protocols, training and equipment for law enforcement 
agencies responding to WMD incidents would be the potential exponential growth of 
resilience of local law enforcement agencies to WMD incidents through resource sharing 
as outlined in the NIMS.21 In a recent “Bio-Response Report Card” of national 
preparedness The BiPartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center noted: 
Strengthening the nation’s preparedness and response capabilities for 
large-scale events will significantly improve the grades (response 
capabilities) for small-scale biological events…the best return on 
investment, in terms of cost, feasibility, national security, and saving lives 
is to change the Ds to Cs on the next report card.  
                                                 
21 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “NIMS: Resource Management,” last modified 
2010,Federal Emergency Management Agency, retrieved January 2, 2011, from 
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ResourceMngmnt.shtm. 
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Based on the deficiencies identified in this assessment, the WMD Center 
recommends concentrating our bio-response efforts on the following three 
strategic priorities:  
• Leadership that inspires confidence, commitment, and unity of effort;  
• Mobilizing a “whole of nation” bio-response capability; and  
• Sustained investment in purpose-driven science.22 
The untold millions of dollars and thousands of local law enforcement agency 
personnel hours spent on handling “suspicious powder” incidents alone would indicate a 
serious financial imperative to develop a national approach for local law enforcement 
agency WMD incident response.23 Without the ability to share resources due to differing 
protocols, equipment and training, local law enforcement agencies can only contribute to 
the already substantial costs involved in responding to WMD incidents due to the 
unnecessarily complicated aspects of coordinating dissimilar local law enforcement 
agency capabilities.  
2. Hypothesis 
This thesis hypothesizes that the development of a national policy mandating 
standardization of policies, equipment and training for local law enforcement WMD 
response would effectively create a successful national preparedness response program 
for WMD incidents. Different models of local law enforcement WMD response are 
analyzed to compare with the New York City Emergency Service Unit WMD response 
model, and the U.S. Bomb Squad and United Kingdom law enforcement CBRN training 
programs are analyzed as examples of successful national preparedness response 
programs. 
3. Arguments 
The literature offers little evidence that policymakers at the federal, state or local 
levels have considered the benefits of standardized local law enforcement response to 
                                                 
22 Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, Bio-Response Report Card: 21st Century Biological 
Threats(Washington, DC: The WMD Center 2011), The WMD Center, 60, retrieved February 3, 2012, 
from http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf. 
23 “White Powder Jobs Are Now Epidemic,” American Police Beat, December 13, 2008, 13.  
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WMD incidents or the challenges of continuing a decentralized, non-standardized 
approach. In fact, much emphasis has been placed on getting as much federal DHS grant 
funding to the “local” municipal level for WMD preparedness without federal standards 
regarding training, equipment or protocols to accomplish the homeland security 
mission.24 This gap in local law enforcement WMD preparedness is examined through a 
historical perspective of recent U.S. preparedness efforts, with the NYPD’s efforts to 
address WMD preparedness used as an example. The lack of WMD detection equipment 
standards is explored, and four local law enforcement agencies’ HazMat teams are used 
as examples of the current types of local law enforcement response models in use 
nationally. The NFPA’s evolution of WMD response standards from discipline-specific 
to mission-centric is explored, and the (proposed) national law enforcement deployment 
teams are compared and contrasted to national local law enforcement WMD preparedness 
efforts. A comparison of the American approach to local law enforcement WMD incident 
response to the British approach is conducted, as well as an examination of a successful 
national approach to local law enforcement standardized protocols, training, equipment 
and credentialing: American bomb squads. A possible solution for standardized training 
will be considered through an examination of the National Training Program, with an 
emphasis on leveraging currently existing first responder WMD preparedness programs 
into a national program for local law enforcement agency officers, as well as utilizing the 
credentialing of bomb squads as a model for credentialing local law enforcement WMD 
incident response teams. 
E. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITIES 
The author’s own professional experiences as a supervisor for a major urban law 
enforcement WMD response unit have been useful in understanding the challenges and 
potential dangers at WMD incidents, particularly related to inter-agency cooperation, 
mutual aid, and law enforcement training needs for a WMD incident. 
                                                 
24 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, 2010, U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence, retrieved June 3, 2011, from 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl11053.pdf. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE MODERN ERA OF U.S. 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WMD PREPAREDNESS 
There has been much discussion post-9/11 about improving the first responder 
community’s capabilities to respond to WMD incidents in congressional hearings, trade 
journals, governmental studies and academic research to “prevent, prepare, respond and 
recover” from both terrorist and natural disasters. Yet even with substantial efforts and 
funding spent on this issue during the past nine years, there remains a major national 
preparedness gap due to the lack of national standards for local law enforcement response 
to WMD incidents.25 When Florida Congressman Kendrick Meeks asked NYPD 
Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly about this, by comparing basic law enforcement 
standards to the lack of DHS training standards, the Commissioner stated: 
I believe we should have standards. The Department of Homeland 
Security should have standards and attempt to have a consistency in 
training throughout the country. I can tell you that we use many of the 
skills that our officers receive on a very regular basis in New York City 
because of the size of the city and the activities that go on there. So we are 
using a lot of the skills, so in a way we are able to judge the effectiveness 
of the training almost on a daily basis in New York. But yes, sir, I agree 
that there should be some consistency and there should be some across-
the-board standards.26 
This was at the time an acknowledgement of an old problem (lack of law 
enforcement national preparedness and response standards) within a new post-9/11 era. In 
1996, The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
ushered in the modern era of first responder preparedness for WMDs on a national 
                                                 
25 Government Accountability Office, First Responders’ Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous 
Releases in Urban Areas is Significantly Limited (GAO-08–180) (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2008).  
26 Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology of 
the Committee on Homeland Security, The National Training Program: Is Anti-Terrorism Training For 
First Responders Efficient and Effective, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (2005) (statement of Raymond W. Kelly, 
Commissioner of the New York Police Department).  
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scale.27 This legislation mandated WMD training for first responders in the most 
populous 120 U.S. cities, without regard to the level of terroristic threats to or actual 
incidents in those cities.28 By 1999, Congress authorized the United States Attorney 
General to assist state and local public safety personnel with training and equipment to 
manage terrorist incidents, which was due in part to the recognition that local responders 
would be the initial responding governmental authorities to such incidents.29 The 
Attorney General gave this responsibility to its Justice Department, which implemented 
this training through the Office of Justice Programs’ Office for Domestic Preparedness. 
The Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
National Training and Education Division currently fulfills this role.30 Although WMD 
training has been offered to law enforcement by the federal government since 1997, no 
credentialing apparatus related to that training currently exists.31 Accountability issues 
regarding federal counter terrorism training have instead focused on: 
• possible duplication of federal counter-terrorism training programs 
• the determination of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
counterterrorism training priorities, and 
• possible redundancy and coordination of DHS counterterrorism training 
programs32 
Even though local law enforcement personnel may currently enroll in many DHS-
sponsored courses related to HazMat training, the training process itself does not result in 
an official certification or credentialing of competency over a specific body of knowledge 
                                                 
27 Jeff Ryan and Jan Glarum, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological 
Threats (New York: Elsevier, 2008).  
28 Ibid. 
29 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 
Domestic Preparedness Program(Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998), U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, retrieved January 10, 2010, from 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99016t.pdf 
30 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Training and Education Division,” last 
modified 2010, Federal Emergency Management Agency, retrieved May 3, 2011, from 
https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/TEI/aboutTEI.jsp. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Reese, Shawn. Federal Counter-Terrorism Training: Issues for Congressional Oversight 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), CRS-2. 
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and/or attainment of specific WMD response-related skills.33 Hence the training, 
experience and abilities of law enforcement personnel regarding response to WMD 
incidents remain non-transferable for purposes of mutual aid. 
B. THE NEED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT HAZMATCORE COMPETENCIES: THE 
NEWYORKCITY EXAMPLE 
The ongoing conundrum within the law enforcement community as evidenced by 
the variety of local law enforcement WMD response models is whether local law 
enforcement agencies should be in charge of terrorist incidents involving WMD 
materials, or whether other local agencies (fire/HazMat) should be, due to the traditional 
HazMat response role of the latter disciplines involving both life safety and HazMat core 
competencies. When asked why the NYPD should be the sole agency in charge of WMD 
incidents, Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly stated, “our uniformed personnel have the 
necessary training and equipment to undertake this responsibility.”34 
Just as importantly, New York City’s lead political authority, the Mayor 
acknowledged through his support of New York City’s Citywide Incident Management 
System the necessity for local law enforcement to manage criminal and/or terrorist WMD 
incidents, which could be done effectively only through the NYPD’s already existing 
HazMat and counter terrorism capabilities. These core competencies are displayed in a 
departmental video for the NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit and are reflective of the 
determination of a local law enforcement agency to develop the protocols, master 
HazMat competencies and invest in specialized WMD detection equipment necessary to 
adequately respond to and manage criminal and terrorist incidents involving WMD 
materials within its jurisdiction.35 
                                                 
33 Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology of 
the Committee on Homeland Security, The National Training Program. 
34 New York City Council, “Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Public Safety Committee” 
(internal document, New York City Council, New York, May 9, 2005), 39–40. 
35 “Inside The NYPD: The Emergency Service Unit Episode 10,” YouTube video, posted 2010, 
retrieved July 11, 2011, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cp1HC38PL4Q&feature=channel.  
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C. THE NYPD’S PRIMARY WMD RESPONSE ENTITY: THE 
EMERGENCY SERVICE UNIT 
The Emergency Service Unit was formed in 1926, as NYPD Commissioner 
Richard E. Enright stated in 1926, to “save imperiled lives in cases of emergency by 
special apparatus with which they are equipped.36This part-time status unit was known 
then as the Reserve Squad until 1930, at which time the unit was given full-time status 
and renamed the Emergency Service Division.37 The initial patrolmen to enter this rescue 
squad were trained in a variety of emergency equipment to handle a multitude of 
scenarios, including the use of tear gas to quell riots; extricating individuals trapped by 
debris or under a train; rescuing a horse out of a river; utilizing special weapons such as 
machine guns for tactical situations; or assisting individuals in overturned boats, to name 
but a few. In a show of interagency cooperation, in September 1928 officers from the 
Reserve Squad were requested by the FDNY Assistant Chief Joseph B. Martin to train 
with FDNY’s Rescue Squad’s 1 and 2 for thirty days to “familiarize them [Reserve 
Squad members] with the use of tools and appliances of the rescue squads, and create 
greater cooperation between the rescue companies of the Fire Department and the 
emergency squads of the Police Department.”38 Although NYPD Commissioner Enright 
at the time stated that the NYPD’s rescue units were formed to “save the Fire Department 
emergency squadrons from unnecessary duty,” the Emergency Service Unit’s utility 
became apparent almost as soon as its start, as the unit answered nearly three thousand 
calls within its first six months of service.39 The dedication of the ESD’s officers was 
apparent by the many rescues that were made utilizing the over 100 pieces of equipment 
that were added to their response trucks, including for example acetylene torches and 
                                                 
36 “To Form New Police Squad,” The New York Times, September 15, 1926, retrieved April 3, 2013, 
from http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0D14FF345E1B7A93C7A81782D85F428285F9. 
37 “Whalen Sets up Emergency Squads,” The New York Times, March 11, 1930, retrieved April 3, 
2013, from 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F20C13F93B5D157A93C3A81788D85F448385F9. 
38 “Policemen to Study Rescues with Fire Department Squad” The New York Times, August 29, 1928, 
retrieved April 3, 2013 from 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F20F16F73458167A93CBAB1783D85F4C8285F9.  
39 “Police Rescue Squads Dash out on Odd Tasks” The New York Times, May 3, 1931, retrieved April 
3, 2013, from 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F30B1FFF395C117A93C1A9178ED85F458385F9. 
 15 
oxygen tanks.40  ESU also handled tactical situations exceedingly well, with a local 
newspaper at the time proclaiming that “there is probably no more complete an outfit in 
existence.”41Although FDNY had developed rescue units fifteen years prior to the 1930 
creation of the full-time Emergency Service Division, the creation of a police rescue 
squad allowed for an additional entity within New York City to address the multitude of 
emergency situations confronting the New York City populace. A local newspaper 
reported, “Previous to the installation of the first of these emergency trucks, New York 
was without adequate protection in emergencies in which immediate help was needed.”42 
In 1948, by mayoral order the Police Department was put in charge of all emergencies 
except fires, in large part due to the exceptional performance of the Emergency Service 
Division in handling its varied rescue assignments.43 Author Cy Egan wrote the 
following about the ESD’s role at WMD incidents: 
The policemen detailed to the work carry dosimeters and ion chambers to 
measure radiation levels and mark off danger areas for evacuation. All 
wear ray-absorbing film badges designed to record the amount of radiation 
each man receives during any particular job. The specially coded badges 
undergo laboratory analysis after each incident so that policemen 
threatened with dangerous overexposure can be withdrawn from the work. 
The ESD maintains close liaison with the Atomic Energy Commission to 
update training and methods for handling nuclear mishaps, which are 
expected to grow in coming decades with increasing use of atomic 
reactors to generate power.44 
During the 1980s, the Koch administration considered giving the FDNY a wider 
role at car accidents, building collapses, water rescues and gas leaks due to increases in 
drug-related crime putting pressure on the NYPD in the form of increased response times 
to emergency incidents; fire incidents, in contrast, had decreased by one-third over the 
                                                 





43 Todd Purdum, “Race to Rescue: Police-Fire Feud Dates from the 30’s,”The New York Times, June 
9, 1988, retrieved April 3, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/09/nyregion/race-to-rescue-police-
fire-feud-dates-from-the-30-s.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
44 Cy Egan, Some Very Special Men. 
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preceding decade.45Mayor Koch ultimately decided not to proceed with those 
recommendations, and periodically jurisdictional disputes have arisen due to the similar 
capabilities of some aspects of FDNY rescue units and the Emergency Service Unit, with 
the most recent iteration in the form of resistance to NYPD single agency command at 
WMD incidents (McGeary, 2007) (Esposito, 2011) as dictated by the New York City 
Citywide Incident Management System. The similarities end when discerning between 
hazmat incidents versus WMD incidents, whereas WMD incidents, due to their very 
nature, involve terrorists inclined to kill and injure as many civilians as possible; it would 
be reckless and irresponsible to send unarmed medical, fire or other rescue workers into a 
WMD environment until it is tactically safe enough for them to operate. To do otherwise 
would be to risk these same rescue workers becoming unnecessary casualties of 
secondary or otherwise unanticipated attacks. An example would be a “dirty bomb” 
incident followed immediately by terrorist active shooters hoping to kill as many 
responding rescuers as possible. Today’s Emergency Service Unit training prepares its 
officers with capabilities surpassed by no other local emergency response agencies, 
including minimal competency requirements of EPA Hazardous Materials Technician 
certification; NYS Emergency Medical Technician-Basic certification; Professional 
Association of Diving Instructors’ Open Water Rescue Diver certification; ROCO Rope 
Rescue Technician certification; one month of Special Weapons and Tactics training; and 
a multitude of additional skill sets which must also be mastered before the Emergency 
Service Unit candidates are allowed to graduate from the Emergency Service Unit 
Specialized Training School’s six-month training program.  
D. THE LACK OF MANDATORY FEDERAL CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL/ 
RADIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT STANDARDS 
The Department of Homeland Security has for the past 11 years been tasked with 
providing grants for state and local governments to purchase 
chemical/biological/radiological detection equipment to further this nation’s counter 
terrorism preparedness efforts. It does this, however, in a way that diminishes the ability 
                                                 
45Purdum, “Race to Rescue.” 
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for municipalities to conduct mutual aid; that is, compare “apples to apples” when 
sharing resources across municipalities. NIMS’ resource sharing in principle works when 
defining resources by “type” and “kind,” but becomes intricately more difficult to 
determine local law enforcement WMD response capabilities when CBRN detection 
equipment is bought by different manufacturers with different capabilities, operating 
considerations, models, features and limitations.46 As DHS has no regulatory authority to 
enforce mandatory standards for state and local law enforcement agencies which buy 
CBRN detection equipment, it has no ability to develop mandatory CBRN detection 





                                                 
46Government Accountability Office, First Responders’ Ability to Detect.  
47 Ibid. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. ANALYSIS OF PREPAREDNESS DISPARITIES AMONG CURRENT 
MODELS OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WMD RESPONSE 
An examination of the most populated 100 U.S. cities reveals four different 
models of local law enforcement preparedness for WMD incidents.48 The first model is 
for law enforcement agencies to have very little organized response capabilities, relying 
instead on other first responder agencies, usually the local fire service and/or HazMat 
teams, to handle HazMat incidents. This accounts for approximately eighty percent of the 
law enforcement agencies for the 100 most populated U.S. cities examined by the author. 
 Other law enforcement agencies have multi-agency HazMat response teams, 
consisting of a combination of HazMat trained local/state/federal law enforcement, fire 
service, and/or local HazMat unit team members working together at HazMat incidents. 
An example includes the Miami-Dade Florida Police Department: 
1. Miami Dade Hazardous Materials Crime Unit 
The HMCU investigates incidents of a deliberate and intentional nature involving 
hazardous materials.  In order to facilitate complete and consistent investigations, the 
Hazardous Materials Crime Unit merges three major duties.  This includes HAZMAT 
response where emergency teams don their state of the art personal protective gear and 
use hazardous material and chemical agent detection systems to monitor contaminants for 
safety and identification purposes. Scientists conduct on-site chemical forensic testing to 
characterize and identify toxic constitutes and predict environmental and human health 
risks as a result of chemical discharge. The second duty includes chemical crime scene 
processing where scenes are thoroughly combed for prints, tracks, and any other evidence 
that might lead to a possible suspect.  The third duty includes research, surveillance, and 
interviewing prospective witnesses and suspects.  Unit scientists also interpret technical 
data and analytical results and authenticate evidence.  The HMCU also provides guidance 
                                                 
48 Based on author’s examination of most populated 100 U.S. cities’ and 38 states’ law enforcement 
agency websites. 
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on scientific matters and policies affecting the Department; provides training for 
department-wide response to science crimes; and coordinates and assists other 
investigative entities. The unit works in conjunction with various other local, state, and 
federal agencies committed to the investigation and deterrence of hazardous materials 
crimes.49 
Still other law enforcement agencies have a “combination” of roles—SWAT or 
bomb squad teams whose personnel are also trained as HazMat technicians. An example 
would be the found using the Phoenix Arizona Police Department’s Bomb Squad training 
requirements. 
2. Phoenix Arizona Police Department Bomb Squad 
Bomb Technicians must be familiar with electronics, x-ray interpretation, 
hazardous materials and other job-related skills. Most technicians are also certified 
HazMat technicians through the state of Arizona.50 
Some police agencies have stand-alone HazMat teams consisting of law 
enforcement officers trained to the HazMat technician level. An example would be the 
New Jersey State Police Department: 
3. New Jersey State Police Department Hazardous Materials Response 
Unit 
The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) has a multi-function mission in 
the response, force protection, and support in the State Police role as a law enforcement, 
interdiction, and prevention agency. HMRU provides response and planning support for 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents to include, agent 
surveillance, detection, evidence collection, sampling and identification of Hazardous 
Materials/CBRNE materials. HMRU can also provide direct support in decontamination, 
environmental monitoring, scene management, and resource acquisition. 
                                                 
49Miami Dade County,” Miami Dade Police Department Hazardous Materials Crime Unit,” last 
modified 2010,Miami Dade County, retrieved February 2, 2011, from 
http://www.miamidade.gov/mdpd/BureausDivisions/IGB/cis. 
50 City of Phoenix, “Phoenix Police Department—Bomb Squad,” last modified 2010, City of Phoenix, 
retrieved February 2, 2011, from http://www.ci.phoenix.az.us/police/bomb1.html. 
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NJSP HMRU provides round the clock response capabilities to hazardous 
materials, clandestine laboratories, and CBRN incidents throughout NJ. Its mission is to 
assist local, other state and federal agencies in determining the extent of the incident and 
when necessary, document, collect, and analyze any material(s) or hazardous evidence. 
NJSP HMRU is highly mobile and carries state of the art diagnostic and field 
analytical testing equipment with reach back capability. This reach back capability allows 
for the information and findings in the field to be transmitted and viewed by specialists in 
a specific field. 
HMRU also is tasked to provide CBRN / HazMat training to include: CBRN / 
HazMat First Responder Awareness, Operations and Technician level training programs, 
as well as, custom designed responder training programs.51 
These law enforcement HazMat team categories can be further broken down by 
mission type, as many state law enforcement HazMat teams focus solely on commercial 
vehicle HazMat enforcement. The Colorado State Patrol is such an example. 
4. Colorado State Patrol Hazardous Materials Response Unit 
The Colorado State Patrol Hazardous Materials Unit works to improve the overall 
safety of hazardous material transportation to better protect citizens and the environment. 
This is accomplished by:  
• Safe and efficient movement of hazardous materials on Colorado 
roadways through enforcement of permitting and routing  
• Mutual cooperation with all entities involved in the shipping and 
transportation of hazardous materials 
• Providing prompt response and mitigation resources for on-highway 
hazardous incidents and support of local government through mutual aid 
agreements or other formal requests for assistance 
• Designation and maintenance of hazardous and nuclear materials 
transportation routes 
                                                 
51New Jersey State Police, “New Jersey State Police Hazardous Materials Response Unit,” last 
modified 2010, New Jersey State Police, retrieved February 2, 2011, from 
http://www.state.nj.us/njsp/divorg/homelandsec/hrmu.html. 
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• Adoption of permitting, routing, and safe transportation rules and 
regulations 
• Enforcement of applicable laws, rules, and regulations  
Program goals are accomplished through the deployment of at least 24 fully 
trained and equipped troopers (hazardous material specialists). Specialists are deployed in 
12, two-person teams assigned throughout the state.52 
The diversity of HazMat training and WMD preparedness as demonstrated for 
local law enforcement is as varied as the four different models described. This diversity 
also corresponds to municipalities’ expectations and requirements of law enforcement 
agencies at HazMat incidents.  
B. EXPLORATION OF THE ADOPTION OF WMD RESPONSE 
STANDARDS FROM DISCIPLINE-SPECIFIC TO MISSION-CENTRIC 
The National Fire Protection Agency is a voluntary, non-regulatory organization 
accredited through the American National Standards Institute and recognized as the 
accepted developer of consensus life safety codes, standards, training and education for 
fire prevention, hazardous materials and other hazards.53The 2008 revisions of the 
National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) Technical Standard 472: Professional 
Competencies of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents protocols acknowledged 
that multiple first responder disciplines have responsibilities at terrorist incidents 
involving hazardous materials; the standard was adjusted to be more mission-specific 
than discipline-specific.54 These revisions reflect an understanding of local law 
enforcement agencies’ increased needs to develop stronger HazMat competencies in 
                                                 
52 Colorado State Patrol, “Colorado State Patrol Hazardous Materials Unit,” last modified 2010, 
Colorado State Patrol, retrieved February 2, 2011, from http://csp.state.co.us/hazmat.html. 
53National Fire Protection Agency, “National Fire Protection Agency,” last modified 2010, National 
Fire Protection Agency, retrieved February 2, 2011, from 
http://www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp?categoryID=495&URL=About%20NFPA/Overview. 
54National Fire Protection Agency, NFPA 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous 
Materials/ Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Agency, 2008), 




order to adequately respond to and successfully manage attacks involving WMDs, 
whether criminal or terroristic in nature.55 
C. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WMD RESPONSE 
PREPAREDNESS VERSUS NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
DEPLOYMENT TEAMS 
Although the nation’s thousands of local law enforcement agencies are 
independently operated and controlled by local political jurisdictions, the issue of a 
national law enforcement response force is not equivalent to a national preparedness of 
local law enforcement. The proposed Law Enforcement Deployment Teams (LEDT) 
would consist of law enforcement officers who mobilize to conduct police operations in 
regions which have suffered a breakdown in normal police operations due to a major 
catastrophe, such as Hurricane Katrina.56The teams would mirror currently existing 
national response teams such as FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, and 
would perform investigative duties at large-scale HazMat incidents such as hazardous 
materials identification and handling.57 Local law enforcement communities might 
benefit from a LEDT at the scene of a prolonged major incident involving compromised 
local law enforcement response and capabilities, but such a mechanism may not be as 
efficient or organic as local or regional jurisdictional mutual aid resources for short-term, 
small-scale terrorist incidents involving chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear 
materials. This highlights the importance of a credentialing process within a law 
enforcement WMD response training program—the ability to rapidly verify officers’ 
WMD response skills, knowledge and abilities in “type” and “kind” at a catastrophic 
incident as described in the NIMS typing system.58 
 
                                                 
55Ibid. 
56 Major Cities Chiefs Association, Law Enforcement Deployment Teams (Washington, DC: National 
Terrorism Policy Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “NIMS: Resource Management.” 
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The aforementioned review focused on gaps in federal policies regarding standard 
protocols, equipment, and training; on various states of local law enforcement WMD 
incident response capabilities, and the evolution of WMD response standards from 
discipline-specific to mission-centric.  
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IV. TOWARD A COMMON STANDARD 
A. WHAT WE CAN PREDICT REGARDING FUTURE U.S.WMD 
INCIDENTS 
In January 2010, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism gave a follow-up report to their earlier 
report, World at Risk.59 The Commission specified four factors that led up to their 
assessment that a WMD attack would occur within this decade: 
1. There is direct evidence that terrorists are trying to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction. 
2. Acquiring WMD fits the tactical profile of terrorists.  
3. Terrorists have demonstrated global reach and the organizational 
sophistication to obtain and use WMD.  
4. The opportunity to acquire and use such weapons is growing exponentially 
because of the global proliferation of nuclear material and biological 
technologies.60 
Figure 2 is a graphic utilizing U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Hazardous 
Materials Unit data compiled from 1997 to 2010 depicting FBI response to WMD 
incidents in the United States.61 The figures for 1999 were unavailable at the time of this 
writing, and suspicious “white powder” incidents were given their own category in 2007 
separate from the biological incidents category. 
                                                 
59 U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 
Report Card: Government Failing to Protect America from Grave Threats of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism, 2010). 
60Ibid. 
61 Pat O’Brien (Federal Bureau of Investigation) fax to author, February 8, 2010. Data used for this 



































































Figure 2.  FBI HMRU Number of WMD Incidents in the U.S. from 1997 to 2009 
This data indicates an absence of clear patterns, in that one cannot predict with 
any certainty the nature or number of future WMD threats this nation will likely face; 
hence WMD preparedness has to be a wide-ranging enterprise. This supports the 
assertion that a national strategy for local law enforcement training and response to 
WMD incidents is necessary as local law enforcement agencies currently cannot 
reasonably prepare for all potential threats, especially WMD threats. In other words, the 
shared threat of potential WMD attacks is a national one—local law enforcement 
standardized preparedness and response should be a national effort as well. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL TRAINING AND RESPONSE 
STANDARDS FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT WMD 
INCIDENTS 
While the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security focused on national 
standards for emergency response training and preparedness, the 2007 National Strategy 
emphasized the importance of local communities utilizing mutual aid to handle incidents 
beyond their own capabilities: 
 27 
One of the fundamental response principles is that all incidents should 
be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible [emphasis added]. 
The initial response to the majority of incidents typically is handled by 
local responders within a single jurisdiction and goes no further. When 
incidents exceed available resources, the local or Tribal government may 
rely on mutual aid agreements with nearby localities or request additional 
support from the State.62 
Mutual aid relies on personnel and equipment having the same standards and 
capabilities from one jurisdiction to another. These include a variety of HazMat 
equipment standards related to law enforcement usage.63 Even though the question of 
equipment standards is being addressed, the idea of standard law enforcement response 
capabilities at WMD incidents is not. In New YorkState, a number of law enforcement 
agencies like the NYPD have developed robust HazMat response capabilities, including 
the HazMat technician training standard for its Emergency Service Unit (or equivalent) 
officers, which allows them to control HazMat site operations, assess potential hazards, 
and identify risks associated with WMD incidents.64 Since the first goal of the N.Y.S. 
homeland security strategy is to “Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and 
Decontamination,” it would appear consistent with that goal to develop a uniform 
standard for law enforcement response capacities across not only New York State but 
regionally and nationally with regard to law enforcement HazMat training, equipment, 
and capabilities. A number of the New York State Office of Homeland Security strategy 
objectives for this goal speak to the idea of a standardized response: 
• Obj. Coordinate CBRNE response planning to address events that 
overwhelm jurisdictional capabilities and call for higher-level state or 
federal resources 
                                                 
62 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 33. 
63 These hazmat standards include: NIOSH CBRN respiratory standards development, respiratory 
threats for first responders, verification method for gas mask fit test, chemical/biological personal 
protective equipment standards, emergency responder protection against TICs/TIMs, and next generation 
high explosives standards requirements. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guidelines for 
HazMat/WMD Response, Planning and Prevention Training (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2003). 
64 New York City Police Department, “Inside the NYPD Emergency Service Unit,” last modified 
September 10, 2013, New York City Police Department, retrieved August 13, 2013, from 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/videos.shtml. 
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• Obj. Ensure responders have appropriate personal protective equipment 
(PPE) for safety within a CBRNE environment based on their 
responsibilities 
• Obj. Identify CBRNE equipment needs and purchase DHS-approved 
equipment to close identified gaps 
• Obj. Identify CBRNE training shortfalls and conduct training to close 
identified gaps 
• Obj. Ensure responders have the appropriate knowledge, skills, ability, 
and equipment to recognize a true WMD situation 
• Obj. Maintain and/or replace equipment on the weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) trailers that were previously delivered to jurisdictions 
by the NYS Office of Homeland Security (OHS) 
• Obj. Enhance capacity for decontamination both on-scene and at 
secondary locations, such as hospitals 
• Obj. Implement regional solutions to enhance the capabilities of New 
York state’s local Hazardous Materials (HazMat) Response Teams 
• Obj. Enhance bomb squad readiness through targeted planning, training, 
exercise, and equipment acquisition activities 
• Obj. Enhance improvised explosive device (IED) awareness and 
preparedness capabilities through education, detection, and target 
hardening activities65 
The development of a uniform law enforcement WMD HazMat response standard 
could not only benefit the citizens of New York state with a consistent law enforcement 
HazMat response to WMD HazMat incidents across the state, it would become an 
important example of how a how a mandatory national standard could benefit the 
country.  It is the author’s belief that other law enforcement agencies may not train their 
officers to this standard for a variety of reasons. There may be the belief that the current 
capabilities of their jurisdiction’s other disciplines (fire / hazmat / environmental 
protection) are sufficient; or there may be a concern that the resources necessary to 
develop a law enforcement HazMat capacity would divert spending from other areas; or 
                                                 
65 See Appendix B for the complete list of objectives for the NYS Homeland Security: Goal 1, 
Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination. New York State Office of Homeland 
Security, New York State Homeland Security Strategy, 2009, New York State Office of Homeland Security, 
retrieved January 10, 2010, from www.dhses.ny.gov/media/../2009_nys_homeland_security_strategy.pdf 
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there may not be enough concern that there is sufficient risk of a WMD incident within 
their jurisdictions to develop a law enforcement HazMat response capability.  
The necessity of this adoption reflects the current disparity of knowledge, skills 
and abilities in local law enforcement agency WMD/HazMat teams nationally. For 
instance, OSHA 1910.120 (q) refers to an individual’s HazMat training using awareness, 
operations, and technician level capabilities without referring to how those competencies 
relate to law enforcement WMD/HazMat team responsibilities at WMD incidents.66 
There is a compelling need for the development of a mandatory national standard that 
matches law enforcement agencies’ expected HazMat competencies with required law 
enforcement duties at WMD/HazMat incidents. The adoption of this standard should 
greatly increase the efficacy, efficiency and utility of same by enabling law enforcement 
agencies to conduct critical resource sharing at large or complex WMD incidents. The 
ability of law enforcement agencies to share critical HazMat resources at a large scale 
WMD incident could dramatically increase the ability of law enforcement agencies to 
conduct WMD response activities within a hazardous environment. The following two 
diagrams depict the limitations in resource sharing due to the lack of the same capabilities 
from local law enforcement agencies. Agencies may utilize federal, state or local 
personnel assigned to their jurisdiction (Figure3) or may be part of a standalone regional 
response team (Figure 4). 
                                                 
66 U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Safety and Occupational Health, “29 CFR Hazardous Waste 
Operations and Emergency Response.—1910.120(q)(6),” Office of Safety and Occupational Health, 





Figure 3.  Current Federal/State/Local Agency Resource Sharing Model 
 
 
Figure 4.  Standalone Regional Response Model 
 
Figure 5 depicts how credentialed law enforcement WMD HazMat teams would 







Figure 5.  Credentialed Law Enforcement WMD Hazmat Team “Force Multiplier” Model 
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At a large WMD terrorist incident, geographical or jurisdictional boundaries 
become meaningless to the affected victims, as CBRN attacks do not necessarily stay 
within city, county or state boundaries. Terrorists need only the ability, willingness and 
opportunity to cause an attack using CBRN, which is why it is critical that law 
enforcement agencies locally, regionally and nationally have the ability to respond with 
equivalent capabilities, thereby robbing terrorists of the opportunity to find a weak link in 
a state or region’s law enforcement WMD preparedness and response efforts.  
C. U.S. BOMB SQUAD PROGRAM AS AN EXAMPLE OF A NATIONAL 
PREPAREDNESS APPROACH 
A credentialing process would ensure local law enforcement WMD/HazMat 
teams would respond to WMD incidents with the same capabilities, as bomb squads 
currently do locally, regionally and nationally. Bomb squads are accredited by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and overseen by the National Bomb Squad Commanders 
Advisory Board, which serves as a leadership component of the United States bomb 
squad program, with the following responsibilities: 
• Serves as the recognized point of contact on all matters related to U.S. 
Bomb Squads. 
• Resolving issues regarding certification and accreditation. 
• Making recommendations concerning HDS and other training. 
• Reviewing research and development needs. 
• Acting as a steering committee for bomb squad commanders’ conferences. 
• Examining issues related to the FBI’s Special Agent bomb technician 
liaison program and other federal programs that are of importance to the 
board and bomb squads. 
• Develop and publish long range strategic plans and recommendations for 
bomb squad development.67 
The very first preparedness tasks and measures/metrics to be utilized for 
explosive device response operations include the following activities: 
                                                 
67 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, “About NBSCAB,” last modified 2009, 
retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nbscab.org/NBSCAB/nbscab_ex.php. 
 33 
1. Critical Tasks 
• Res.B2c 1—Develop procedures and standardized training to deal with 
terrorist events, including WMD suicide bombers, vehicle and radio 
controlled improvised explosive devices. 
• Res.B2c 1.1—Ensure all squads remain accredited and technicians 
certified. 
• Res. B2c 1.2—Assist squads in achieving a Type I rating [emphasis 
added].68 
2. Preparedness Measures 
• Bomb squad is accredited by the FBI to standards set by the National 
Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board. 
• Procedures exist for dealing with suicide bombers 
• Procedures exist for dealing with vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices69 
The national bomb squad community has demonstrated the importance of a 
credentialing process for specialty law enforcement units, and it is the author’s belief that 
local law enforcement agencies can address a major deficiency in the current national 
strategy toward terrorism local law enforcement response involving WMDs—a lack of a 
credentialing system for law enforcement WMD response personnel to meet equivalent 
minimum training competencies.  Using the U.S. bomb squad program’s national 
approach of utilizing the same training, equipment, and standard operating procedures to 
deal with incidents involving explosives could be very useful in designing a similar 
program for local law enforcement personnel who respond to incidents involving 
chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear materials, as the mechanisms to do so already 
exist. The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) is an excellent platform, 
as it provides specialized, tailored training to enhance the capacity of emergency 
responders to handle incidents of national significance, especially terrorist incidents 
involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons of mass 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Morris County, New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, Explosive Device Response 
Operations, 2005, Morris County, New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, retrieved March 3, 2010, 
from http://www.morrisoem.org/blogs/Explosive_Device.pdf. 
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destruction.70 The NDPC executes the Department of Homeland Security’s National 
Training Program through a professional alliance of several members: 
1. Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) in Anniston, Alabama,  
2. New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (New Mexico Tech), 
3. Louisiana State University’s Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education 
(National Center for Biomedical Research and Training),  
4. Texas A&M University National Emergency Response and Rescue 
Training Center (TEEX) 
5. Department of Energy’s Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the  
6. Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI).71 
These organizations are nationally recognized as experts in bioterrorism, 
chemicals, and radiological/nuclear devices. NDPC reflects the missions of all these 
organizations with its commitment to provide quality, cost-effective counter-terrorism 
training to the nation’s emergency responders. The National Training Program facilitates 
identification of training needs, based on the tasks and capabilities defined in the 
“universal task list”(UTL) and “target capabilities list”(TCL).72 Based on these needs, 
and by utilizing existing programs as much as possible, training is created so the 
homeland security community develops the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to 
appropriately prevent, prepare for respond and mitigate both man-made and natural 
disasters. These programs have trained over 1,500,000 first responders since the NDPC’s 




                                                 
70National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, “National Domestic Preparedness Consortium,” last 
modified 2010, National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, retrieved September 4, 2010, from 
http://www.ndpc.us/. 
71 Ibid. 
72 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Training 
Program Grant Application Kit,”2005, U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs, retrieved 
September 4, 2010, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/archives/solicitations/docs/fy05hsntp. 
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…enhance the preparedness of federal, state, local, and tribal emergency 
responders/first receivers and teams, including non-governmental 
organizations and the private sector, to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to 
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and all-hazard 
high-consequence events by developing, delivering, and assessing plans, 
training, technical assistance, and exercises.73 
The NDPC has demonstrated the ability to successfully train local law 
enforcement personnel at the national level. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
HazMat Response Unit has the mission of: 
...responding to criminal acts and incidents that involve hazardous 
materials (HAZMAT). The unit develops technical proficiency and 
readiness for crime scene and evidence-related operations in cases 
involving chemical, biological, and radiological materials and wastes and 
trains U.S. and international law enforcement in these skills. It also 
provides site safety oversight of FBI personnel operating in high hazard 
crime scenes.”74 
The NDPC, in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hazardous 
Materials Response Unit, could leverage NDPC’s currently existing HazMat training 
programs to create a national local law enforcement (procedural/equipment/HazMat) 
training and credentialing process specific to law enforcement responsibilities at terrorist 
incidents involving CBRN. This would then allow for significantly increased mutual aid 
of law enforcement WMD response teams at large-scale terrorist incidents that involve 
chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear materials. 
D. THE UNITED KINGDOMEXAMPLE: LAW ENFORCEMENT CBRN 
TRAINING 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have historically faced internal 
and external terrorist threats from a variety of sources. The British government’s official 
strategy for combating international terrorism, known as CONTEST, is described by the 
United Kingdom’s Office for the Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office as 
                                                 
73U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, (2010). National Domestic Preparedness 
Consortium, retrieved September 4, 2010, from http://www.ndpc.us/ 
74 U.S. Department of Justice, “Federal Bureau of Investigation—Hazardous Materials Response,” last 
modified 2010, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, retrieved September 4, 2010, from 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/html/hmru1.htm.  
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consisting of countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism through 
activity in four areas:  
1. Prevent—to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent 
extremism; 
2. Pursue—to stop terrorist attacks; 
3. Protect—to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack, and; 
4. Prepare—where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.75 
The United Kingdom utilizes a national CBRN training center to prepare its 
officers to operate safely at such incidents without jeopardizing personal safety or the 
mission at hand. The Police National CBRN Centre’s doctrine states specifically that its 
training “provides detailed information that is common to all CBRN trained and equipped 
police officers irrespective of rank or role….[and] forms the basis for common national 
standards of police CBRN training across the entire UK.”76 It further states, “there is no 
place in counter-CBRN policing procedures for regional variations. Mutual aid between 
forces will prove to be an essential tenet of the police response. The safety of police 
CBRN RESPONDERS is paramount.”77 By 2005, nearly 7,000 UK police officers had 
received training from the Centre to ensure they had the necessary skills and equipment 
to respond effectively to CBRN incidents.78 Most importantly, the training, from the 
basic to advanced, espouses clear delineations of the roles of the responding law 
enforcement officers to the CBRN incident, including scene assessment, security, and 
responsibility for overall coordination of the emergency response and initial safety 
management within inner cordons or perimeters at terrorist incidents.79 
                                                 
75 HM Government, Office for the Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism 
(London: Crown, 2010).  
76 Police National CBRN Centre, Police National CBRN Operational Procedures Manual (London: 
HM Government, 2004). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Sergio Bonin, International Biodefense Handbook 2007 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2007). 
79 Police National CBRN Centre, Police National CBRN Operational Procedures Manual.  
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E. UNITED STATES’ LAW ENFORCEMENT WMD TRAINING 
The United States’ counter terrorism strategy as described in the 2007 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security is quite similar to the U.K. national strategy: 
 Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks 
 Protect the American people our critical infrastructure, and key resources 
 Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur 
 Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success80 
If a similarly empowered American equivalent to the United Kingdom’s Police 
National CBRN Centre had created a nationally recognized standard for law enforcement 
WMD response, the nation’s law enforcement community would be able to provide 
resilient regional responses to WMD incidents as opposed to current disjointed 
jurisdictional responses, and share critical law enforcement HazMat resources in a 
manner as described by the National Incident Management System.81 Thus the potential 
development of a mandatory common standard regarding American law enforcement 
response to WMD incidents, with an emphasis on the necessity of training up to and 
including the HazMat technician level, would likely mirror the aforementioned aspects of 
the United Kingdom model. 
 
 
                                                 
80 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Homeland 
Security Council, 2007). 
81 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Typed Resource Definitions: Law Enforcement and 
Security Resources (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The goal of this research was to examine the role of local law enforcement 
personnel at weapons of mass destruction and hazardous materials incidents with regard 
to WMD training, standards and preparedness, and to identify gaps and problems in 
current local law enforcement WMD response preparedness. Different models of local 
law enforcement WMD response were examined to compare with the New York City 
Emergency Service Unit model, and the U.S. Bomb Squad and United Kingdom law 
enforcement CBRN training programs were examined as examples of successful national 
preparedness response programs. This research attempts to provide an understanding of 
whether national standards for local law enforcement WMD preparedness and response is 
an appropriate goal for the federal government.  
The research question asked: How does current local law enforcement WMD 
response preparedness align with current WMD threats?  
A. STANDARDIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT WMD TRAINING, 
CERTIFICATION AND EQUIPMENT 
Current and future law enforcement challenges include potential WMD threats to 
their assigned jurisdictions regardless of historic trends or patterns. Law enforcement 
personnel should receive standardized WMD training and certification to allow for 
resource (personnel) sharing at large-scale WMD incidents, regardless if the law 
enforcement WMD response effort is a single, multi-agency, or multi-jurisdictional 
response. It is also important that law enforcement agencies become “literate in the 
language” of WMD/hazmat incident response to allow for appropriate tactical decision-
making to render WMD incident scenes secure for other rescue personnel to operate. 
Standardized WMD response equipment would be appropriate to ensure maximum utility 
and safety of multi-jurisdictional and/or multi-agency personnel working collaboratively 
at a large-scale WMD incident. The NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit practices this 
citywide by having ten different geographic areas patrolled by ten separate entities known 
as squads or trucks. These individual squads or trucks have the same equipment, and the 
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personnel assigned to them have the same training and certifications, although their 
experience levels are as varied as the amount of time each member has assigned to the 
unit. Ultimately, if there are not enough individuals assigned to a truck, other officers 
from other trucks can and are assigned to work in the truck lacking personnel; in a large-
scale incident, the traditionally small amount of personnel with the training, 
competencies and equipment to address a WMD incident will need to work together to 
maximize the amount of people saved. This can only be done if similar training, 
equipment and certifications are used by all involved municipalities.  
B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH NEEDED TO DEVELOP SUCCESSFUL 
NATIONAL STRATEGIES 
Additional research should be undertaken to develop successful national strategies 
to standardize law enforcement training and equipment to prevent, defend against, and 
defeat future WMD terrorism threats that threaten this country. Finally, the role of law 
enforcement at WMD incidents must be further defined, refined and standardized to 
develop a common vision toward a common standard to successfully defeat an 
increasingly common threat. 
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82National Fire Protection Agency, NFPA 472. 
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APPENDIX B. NYS 2009 HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY:  
GOAL 1 
Goal 1: Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination 
Capabilities83 
Obj. Ensure that CBRNE Response Plans, including County HazMat Plans, are updated regularly 
Obj. Coordinate CBRNE response planning to address events that overwhelm jurisdictional capabilities 
and call for higher-level State or federal resources 
Obj. Ensure responders have appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for safety within a 
CBRNE environment based on their responsibilities 
Obj. Identify CBRNE equipment needs and purchase DHS-approved equipment to close identified gaps 
Obj. Identify CBRNE training shortfalls and conduct training to close identified gaps 
Obj. Ensure responders have the appropriate knowledge, skills, ability, and equipment to recognize a 
true WMD situation 
Obj. Conduct multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional HSEEP-compliant exercises to test CBRNE plans, 
protocols, and response procedures 
Obj. Maintain and/or replace equipment on the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) trailers that were 
previously delivered to jurisdictions by the NYS Office of Homeland Security (OHS) 
Obj. Enhance capacity for decontamination both on-scene and at secondary locations, such as hospitals 
Obj. Implement regional solutions to enhance the capabilities of New York State’s local Hazardous 
Materials (HazMat) Response Teams 
Obj. Enhance bomb squad readiness through targeted planning, training, exercise, and equipment 
acquisition activities 
Obj. Enhance Improvised Explosive Device (IED) awareness and preparedness capabilities through 
education, detection, and target hardening activities 
Obj. Enhance radiological capabilities through continued participation in the “Securing the Cities” 
initiative in the NYC metropolitan area 
Obj. Using the model provided by the “Securing the Cities” initiative, develop and implement the State 
Radiation Defense Plan to build statewide radiological detection capabilities 
Obj. Develop and implement a Radioactive Materials Source Security Program in New York State 
 
 
                                                 
83 NYS Homeland Security: Goal 1, Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination, 
New York State Office of Homeland Security, New York State Homeland Security Strategy. 
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Obj. Develop a statewide capability to monitor and assess environmental health impacts of a CBRNE 
event 
Obj. Enhance laboratory capability and capacity for the detection of chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear threat agents 
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APPENDIX C. 2008 U.S. ANNUAL CENSUS DATA 
2008 U.S. Annual Census Estimates of Resident Populations of Cities and States with Selected U.S. Cities’ and States’ Police 


















State Police      
   Hazmat 
1 New York New York 8,363,710 19,490,297 36,200 1 4,700 1 
2 Los Angeles California 3,833,995 36,553,215 9,900 1 7,140 1 
3 Chicago Illinois 2,853,114 12,901,563 13,400 0 2,100 0 
4 Houston Texas 2,242,193 24,326,974 5,100 0 7,600 0 
5 Phoenix Arizona 1,567,924 6,500,180 3,500 1 1,125 1 
6 Philadelphia Pennsylvania 1,447,395 12,448,279 6,600 1 4,200 1 
7 San Antonio Texas 1,351,305 X 2,000 0 X X 
8 Dallas Texas 1,279,910 X 3,100 0 X X 
9 San Diego California 1,279,329 X 2,100 0 X X 
10 San Jose California 948,279 X 1,400 1 X X 
11 Detroit Michigan 912,062 10,003,422 3,500 0 1,860 1 
12 
San 
Francisco California 808,976 X 1,970 0 X X 
13 Jacksonville Florida 807,815 18,328,340 2,950 0 1,530 0 
14 Indianapolis Indiana 798,382 6,376,792 1,580 0 1,310 1 
15 Austin Texas 757,688 X 1,400 0 X X 
                                                 




















State Police      
   Hazmat 
16 Columbus Ohio 754,885 11,485,910 1,890 0 1,500 1 
17 Fort Worth Texas 703,073 X 1,540 0 X X 
18 Charlotte 
North 
Carolina 687,456 9,222,414 1,620 0 1,510 1 
19 Memphis Tennessee 669,651 6,214,888 2,100 0 920 1 
20 Baltimore Maryland 636,919 5,633,597 3,100 0 1,510 1 
21 El Paso Texas 613,190 X 1,100 0 X X 
22 Boston Massachusetts 609,023 6,497,967 2,050 0 2,200 0 
23 Milwaukee Wisconsin 604,477 5,627,967 2,000 0 510 1 
24 Denver Colorado 598,707 4,939,456 1,460 0 680 1 
25 Seattle Washington 598,541 6,549,224 1,285 0 1,060 1 
26 Nashville Tennessee 596,462 X 1,300 0 X X 
27 Washington D.C. 591,833 591,833 4,050 1 0 0 
28 Las Vegas Nevada 558,383 2,600,167 2,600 0 420 1 
29 Portland Oregon 557,706 3,790,060 1,150 0 620 0 
30 Louisville Kentucky 557,224 4,269,245 1,200 0 960 1 
31 
Oklahoma 
City Oklahoma 551,789 3,642,361 1,050 0 810 1 
32 Tucson Arizona 541,811 X 1,050 0 X X 
33 Atlanta Georgia 537,958 9,685,744 1,600 0 1,000 0 
34 Albuquerque New Mexico 521,999 1,984,356 950 0 550 1 
35 Fresno California 476,050 X 810 0 X X 
36 Sacramento California 463,794 X 1,560 0 X X 
37 Long Beach California 463,789 X 985 0 X X 



















State Police      
   Hazmat 
39 Kansas City Missouri 451,572 5,911,605 1,400 0 1,100 0 
40 Omaha Nebraska 438,646 1,783,432 820 0 480 1 
41 Cleveland Ohio 433,748 X 1,600 0 X X 
42 
Virginia 
Beach Virginia 433,746 7,769,089 780 1 1,960 1 
43 Miami Florida 413,201 X 1,100 1 X X 
44 Oakland California 404,155 X 800 0 X X 
45 Raleigh 
North 
Carolina 392,552 X 770 0 X X 
46 Tulsa Oklahoma 385,635 X 800 1 X X 
47 Minneapolis Minnesota 382,605 5,220,393 800 0 530 1 
48 
Colorado 
Springs Colorado 380,307 X 660 0 X X 
49 Honolulu Hawaii 374,676 1,288,198 2,130 1 0 0 
50 Arlington Texas 374,417 X 750 0 X X 
51 Wichita Kansas 366,046 2,802,134 670 1 540 1 
52 St. Louis Missouri 354,361 X 1,900 1 X X 
53 Tampa Florida 340,882 X 1,000 1 X X 
54 Santa Ana California 339,130 X 500 0 X X 
55 Anaheim California 335,288 X 400 0 X X 
56 Cincinnati Ohio 333,336 X 1,050 0 X X 
57 Bakersfield California 321,078 X 300 0 X X 
58 Aurora Colorado 319,057 X 650 1 X X 
59 New Orleans Louisiana 311,853 4,410,796 1,400 0 1,060 1 



















State Police      
   Hazmat 
61 Riverside California 295,357 X 390 0 X X 
62 Toledo Ohio 293,201 X 500 0 X X 
63 Stockton California 287,037 X 440 0 X X 
64 
Corpus 
Christi Texas 286,462 X 400 0 X X 
65 Lexington Kentucky 282,114 X 570 1 X X 
66 St. Paul Minnesota 279,590 X 650 0 X X 
67 Anchorage Alaska 279,243 686,293 370 0 380 0 
68 Newark New Jersey 278,980 8,682,661 1,300 0 2,930 1 
69 Buffalo New York 270,919 X 720 0 X X 
70 Plano Texas 267,480 X 350 0 X X 
71 Henderson Nevada 252,064 X 390 0 X X 
72 Lincoln Nebraska 251,624 X 260 0 X X 
73 Fort Wayne Indiana 251,591 X 460 0 X X 
74 Glendale Arizona 251,522 X 450 0 X X 
75 Greensboro 
North 
Carolina 250,642 X 670 0 X X 
76 Chandler Arizona 247,140 X 340 0 X X 
77 
St. 
Petersburg Florida 245,314 X 540 0 X X 
78 Jersey City New Jersey 241,114 X 890 0 X X 
79 Scottsdale Arizona 235,371 X 430 1 X X 
80 Norfolk Virginia 234,220 X 750 0 X X 
81 Madison Wisconsin 231,916 X 400 0 X X 
82 Orlando Florida 230,519 X 700 0 X X 



















State Police      
   Hazmat 
84 Baton Rouge Louisiana 223,689 X 720 1 X X 
85 Durham 
North 
Carolina 223,284 X 510 1 X X 
86 Laredo Texas 221,659 X 420 0 X X 
87 Lubbock Texas 220,483 X 360 0 X X 
88 Chesapeake Virginia 220,111 X 400 0 X X 
89 Chula Vista California 219,318 X 240 0 X X 





Carolina 217,600 X 500 0 X X 
92 
North Las 
Vegas Nevada 217,253 X 450 0 X X 
93 Reno Nevada 217,016 X 360 0 X X 
94 Gilbert Arizona 216,449 X 220 0 X X 
95 Hialeah Florida 210,542 X 375 0 X X 
96 Arlington Virginia 209,969 X 365 0 X X 
97 Akron Ohio 207,510 X 800 0 X X 
98 Irvine California 207,500 X 160 0 X X 
99 Rochester New York 206,886 X 830 0 X X 
100 Boise Idaho 205,314 1,523,816 325 0 290 0 
   60,442,055 274,404,568 173,315 18 55,765 23 
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